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The decisions of crop farmers, such as how much fertilizer and pesticide to use, can affect 
biodiversity and water quality. Hendricks et al. (2014), for example, find that increased demand 
for corn-based ethanol expanded the so-called dead zone in the Gulf of Mexico by encouraging 
farmers to plant more corn and use more fertilizer. U.S. federal crop insurance may have similar 
unintended effects. Although designed to reduce farm income variability, crop insurance may 
cause farmers to take more risks and apply more fertilizer, plant crops on erodible lands, or 
specialize in fewer crops, thereby exacerbating environmental externalities from agriculture. 
 The growth in federal crop insurance warrants greater study of the program’s unintended 
consequences (Goodwin and Smith, 2013). Crop insurance has expanded significantly since 
2000 and with the 2014 Farm Act is now the main conduit of financial support to farmers. 
Between 2000 and 2013, acres enrolled beyond the most basic coverage increased by 77 percent. 
The corresponding premium subsidies paid by the federal government also increased. Before 
2000 the subsidies never exceeded a billion dollars in real terms; for the years 2011-2013, they 
ranged between $6 and $7 billion annually (Figure 1).   
 The empirical literature on crop insurance provides a generally weak foundation for 
distinguishing the effect of insurance apart from confounding factors. There are no farm-level 
empirical studies of crop insurance and input use that use a sample of national scope and control 
for farm fixed effects. Studies have commonly relied on cross-sectional variation (e.g. Horowitz 
and Lichtenberg, 1993; Smith and Goodwin, 1996), even though time-invariant unobservable 
variables such as land quality and risk attitudes are likely correlated with crop insurance 
participation and input use. O’Donoghue, Roberts, and Key (2009) is an exception, but it only 
considers crop diversification, not input use.  
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 Almost all published studies also assume that crop insurance participation is exogenous 
to farm decisions. This is unlikely. Farmers may shift land from low-input, non-insurable uses to 
high-input, insurable crops (or vice versa) for reasons unrelated to insurance such as changing 
crop prices or farm finances. With the new land use eligible for subsidized insurance, 
participation in insurance would increase along with input use, inducing a spurious correlation 
between the two. Here, Cornaggia (2013) is a notable exception in his treatment of the 
endogeneity of insurance adoption. He exploits the introduction of new insurance policies in 
some counties and not others. However, his data only permit examining the effect of insurance 
on yields, and his identification strategy rests on 14 insurance policy events, with all but one 
occurring before the beginning of our study period.  
 We study how changes in insurance coverage over the 2000-2013 period affected farm-
level crop choice and fertilizer and chemical use while controlling for farm-fixed effects and the 
endogeneity of crop insurance participation. Controlling for farm-fixed effects is possible by our 
creation of a panel data set constructed from 14 years of the annual USDA Agricultural Resource 
Management Survey.  For plausibly exogenous variation in coverage, we exploit the insurance 
program’s limit on how much coverage farmers could purchase. As the incentive to have 
insurance grew, farmers who initially had little coverage could greatly expand coverage; farmers 
already close to the maximum level could not. Instrumenting the change in coverage with each 
farm’s initial coverage ratio–its actual coverage relative to its farm-specific maximum coverage 
possible‒allows us to identify the effect of coverage on production decisions under plausible 
assumptions. Moreover, the non-linear relationship between the initial coverage ratio and the 
subsequent change in coverage allows us to control (linearly) for the initial level of crop 
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insurance coverage in our regressions, making our approach robust to a linear relationship 
between initial coverage and changes in production decisions.   
 In addition to providing plausible estimates of the effects of insurance coverage, we  
create and document a new farm-level panel data set that will enrich future research in 
agriculture and environmental policy. Empirical research related to U.S. farms has been limited 
by the lack of nation-wide panel data at the farm level. Outside of the Census of Agriculture, 
which has a limited scope of questions and occurs once every five years, there has been no 
comprehensive panel data for U.S. farms. Our panel data set is based on the Agricultural 
Resource Management Survey–the only annual nation-wide data source on the finances, 
production practices, and resource use of U.S. farms and the households operating them. Despite 
its design as a cross-sectional survey, nearly 32,500 farms have been surveyed at least twice over 
the 2000-2013 period, thereby providing a rich resource to study dynamic issues and account for 
time-invariant farm heterogeneity.  
 Applying the data to study the effects of crop insurance, our OLS estimates from a first-
differenced model show a positive relationship between coverage and fertilizer and chemical use, 
though smaller than some prior estimates using cross-sectional data. Our instrumental variable 
estimates, however, show that coverage has little effect on crop specialization or input use. The 
estimates are sufficiently precise that even the upper bounds of a 95 percent confidence interval 
represent environmentally negligible effects. Thus, it does not appear that a more generous crop 
insurance program by itself encourages specialization or greater fertilizer and chemical use as 
several prior studies have found. 
 
 
5 
 
1 AGRICULTURE, THE ENVIRONMENT, AND CROP INSURANCE 
1.1 Agriculture and the Environment 
Farmers are the chief managers of arable lands around the world, and their decisions affect 
environmental quality on their lands and beyond (Tilmen et al., 2002). Switching marginal land 
from passive uses into cultivation reduces its value as wildlife habitat. Marginal lands are also 
more prone to soil erosion when cultivated, leading to the sedimentation of lakes and streams 
(Shortle, Abler, and Ribaudo, 2001). For land already in cultivation, a less diverse crop mix 
reduces biodiversity and increases insect and disease problems (Sulc and Tracy, 2007; Landis, 
2008).   
 Fertilizer nutrients or pesticides running into surface water or leaching into groundwater 
can be extensive. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency has identified agricultural nonpoint 
source pollution as a leading source of impairment of the country’s water resources (U.S. EPA, 
2015). Studies have shown that 30 to 40 percent of nitrogen fertilizer applied to crop fields seeps 
into ground or surface water, with losses of 70 percent on the margin (Cambardella et al., 1999; 
Randall and Mulla, 2001; Li et al., 2006). A ten-year study by the U.S. Geological Survey found 
widespread occurrences of pesticides in streams and groundwater, often at concentrations 
deemed harmful to aquatic life and fish-eating wildlife (Gilliom, 2007). A 1990 nation-wide 
survey by the EPA found that 10 percent of community water systems and 4 percent of rural 
domestic wells contain at least one pesticide (EPA, 1990).  
 
1.2 The Federal Crop Insurance Program and Incentives to Participate   
The Risk Management Agency (RMA) of the U.S. Department of Agriculture oversees federal 
crop insurance by operating and managing the Federal Crop Insurance Corporation. RMA sets 
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the terms in which private insurance companies provide insurance to farmers, including the total 
premiums associated with each policy. The federal government encourages participation in crop 
insurance by paying a share of the premium for farmers.  
 With low initial participation by farmers, the government encouraged greater adoption by 
increasing premium subsidies and plan options in the Agricultural Risk Protection Act of 2000 
and the 2008 Farm Act. The 2000 Act increased premium subsidies from an average of 33 
percent of total premiums (across all coverage levels) to an average of 57 percent (O’Donoghue, 
2014). O’Donoghue (2014) shows that the subsidies led farmers to adopt policies with higher 
coverage levels, with a one percent increase in the subsidy rate increasing total premiums and 
premiums per acre by one percent. The 2008 Farm Act maintained subsidies for traditional 
policies and introduced a new option for enterprise units, which came with even higher subsidies 
(80 percent for most coverage levels).  
For both the 2000 and 2008 Acts, the additional subsidies and options would have been 
available in the year following the Act’s authorization. The full effect of the changes on 
coverage, however, likely took several years to occur as farmers learned about the new options in 
a way that is analogous to the adoption of new product or innovation. The rate of adoption of a 
new product or technology often follows the “S-shaped curve” described by the Diffusion of 
Innovations model (Rogers, 2010). The rate of adoption is initially slow and then accelerates 
before leveling off when only a few of those remaining have not adopted. This pattern seems to 
apply to crop insurance adoption. For example, revenue based policies were first introduced in 
1996 but adoption expanded most quickly during the 1998 to 2001 period (Dismukes and Coble, 
2006). Following this pattern, the subsidy increase in 2000 (and 2008) resulted in temporal 
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variation in crop insurance coverage over the next several years as more and more farmers 
adopted insurance in response to the subsidy increases.  
 In addition to changes in subsidies and insurance options, the Renewable Fuel Standard 
and macroeconomic factors also made insurance more attractive by increasing price levels, price 
variability, and consequently profit variability. Increases in energy prices helped increase 
fertilizer and other input prices while U.S. biofuel policy and rising global demand contributed to 
higher crop prices in the second half of our study period (Trostle et al., 2011; Beckman, 
Borchers, and Jones, 2013). Higher input and output prices, in turn, generally increase profit 
variability by magnifying the effect of yield shocks.
1
 Moreover, the U.S. Renewable Fuel 
Standard increased the volatility of corn prices by strengthening the linkage between energy and 
corn markets (McPhail, Du, and Muhammad, 2012; Du and McPhail, 2012; McPhail and 
Babcock, 2012).  
 Figure 1 shows that acres enrolled beyond the basic coverage level increased by 77 
percent over the study period. Acres enrolled beyond the most basic coverage level expanded 
consistently from 2000 to 2005, in part reflecting the delayed effect of changes made in the 2000 
Farm Act. Rising crop and input prices and increased volatility likely played a larger role in 
increasing crop insurance adoption in the later 2000s. Enrolled acres increased by 14 percent in 
2007 alone, then remained steady following the 2008 Farm Act, but saw strong growth over the 
2011-2013 period when corn prices were dramatically higher than most prior years. Premium 
                                                          
1
 Consider crop profits as  𝜋 = 𝑝𝑦 ∙ 𝑦𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑠 + 𝑝𝑥 ∙ 𝑥. For simplicity, assume that only yields are stochastic, in which 
case the variance of profits is 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑝𝑦 ∙ 𝑦𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑠 + 𝑝𝑥 ∙ 𝑥) = 𝑝𝑦
2 ∙ 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑦𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑠), indicating that variability increases 
exponentially with the crop price. If both input and output prices increase proportionally, average profits will 
increase by the same proportion, which could discourage insurance use. Empirically, Coble et al. (1996) find that the 
elasticity of crop insurance with respect to expected marginal revenue is similar in magnitude to the elasticity with 
respect to the variance of marginal revenue (though they have different signs). If their finding holds for recent years, 
it implies that a proportional increase in input and output prices would increase the demand for insurance because it 
would increase profits linearly and profit variability exponentially.     
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subsidies show a roughly similar pattern, though the percent increase was larger, reflecting 
reflects rising production values, which increased expected indemnities and premiums.  
 
1.3 Crop Insurance and Farm Decisions 
There are several reasons why insurance coverage could influence decisions like how much 
fertilizer to apply. According to the moral hazard argument, greater coverage encourages riskier 
production choices, causing farmers to use more risk-increasing inputs and fewer risk-decreasing 
inputs (Pope and Kramer, 1979; Leathers and Quiggin, 1991; Horowitz and Lichtenberg, 1993; 
Babcock and Hennessy, 1996). Sheriff (2005) argues that farmers over-apply nitrogen fertilizer 
to reduce the risk of very low yields, in which case subsidized crop insurance would reduce 
nitrogen use. Whether an input is risk-increasing or risk-decreasing, and consequently how 
insurance affects input use, becomes an empirical question.  
 A similar logic applies to other production decisions that affect profit variability. With 
greater coverage, a risk-averse producer could shift to riskier crops or specialize in one or two 
crops (O’Donoghue, Roberts, and Key, 2009). For farm households, less farm income risk may 
encourage households to spend less time at off-farm jobs and more time on the farm (Key, 
Roberts, and O’Donoghue, 2006). Shifting time or money to the farm could result in cultivation 
of marginal land and more fertilizer used per acre (Chang and Mishra, 2012).  
 However, the potential effects of crop insurance on production via moral hazard should 
not be overstated. Deductibles and premiums depend on yield histories and should therefore 
attenuate moral hazard. The premium a farmer pays also depends on his claim history. A claim in 
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one year increases the premium for following years and reduces the guarantee at which insurance 
pays, effectively increasing the deductible.  
 Federal crop insurance might alter production decisions for other reasons. Because it is is 
heavily subsidized, the program increases the risk-adjusted returns to insured crops. By 
encouraging farmers to shift to insured crops, which may require more inputs, additional 
insurance could increase input use at the farm or regional level, even if it lowered input use on 
individual crops (Wu, 1999; Wu and Adams, 2001; Young, Vandeveer, and Schnepf, 2001; 
Goodwin, Vandeveer and Deal, 2004; Walters et al., 2012). In addition, banks may lend to 
insured farmers at more favorable terms, relaxing financial constraints and making it cheaper to 
buy equipment or inputs to increase yields or plant more acres (Cornaggia, 2013).  
1.4 Empirical Approaches and Findings  
Much of the earliest empirical work examining the production effects of crop insurance used 
cross-sectional data and focused on fertilizer and pesticide application rates. Horowitz and 
Lichtenberg (1993) show large, input-increasing effects of adopting crop insurance, with 
federally insured farms applying 19 percent more nitrogen and spending 21 percent more on 
pesticides than uninsured farms. Two other empirical studies around the same time find that 
insurance reduced chemical use: Quiggin, Karagiannis, and Stanton (1993) for Midwestern corn 
and soybean farmers and Smith and Goodwin (1996) for Kansas wheat farmers. Babcock and 
Hennessy (1996) take a different approach and use data from field experiments to estimate how 
fertilizer use affected crop yield distributions. In a simulation with their parameterized model 
they find that insurance would cause small reductions in nitrogen fertilizer use. 
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 Later empirical work estimated the effect of insurance on a wider range of farm 
outcomes. Wu (1999) shows that in Nebraska, crop insurance shifted land away from hay and 
pasture into corn, which increased chemical use. Goodwin, Vandeveer, and Deal (2004) 
simultaneously estimate the effect of insurance on output and input intensity and find that 
increased participation in insurance programs caused modest changes in acreage and mixed 
effects on fertilizer and chemical expenditures per cropped acre. More recently, Walters et al. 
(2012) use insurance contract data and find acreage responses to insurance for some crops and 
regions but not others. Looking only at crop yields, Cornaggia (2013) exploits the exogenous 
expansion of insurance to new crops and finds that county-level yields increased after the 
expansion. 
 The generally weak foundation for distinguishing the effects of crop insurance from 
confounding factors may explain the diverse findings in the literature. Many studies use cross-
sectional data or assume that insurance decisions are unrelated to unobserved factors that affect 
crop choices or fertilizer use. As noted earlier, this is a tenuous assumption: it is easy to imagine 
a scenario where, for reasons unrelated to crop insurance, a farmer decides to plant more acres of 
corn, which then affects decisions about fertilizer use and insurance coverage. 
 
2. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
2.1 Empirical Approach 
To quantify how crop insurance coverage affects farm decisions and therefore the environment, 
our empirical approach uses a novel unbalanced panel data set (described in the next section) 
with rich farm-level information. The base model relates changes in various outcomes to changes 
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in crop insurance premiums per acre while controlling for initial farm characteristics, county 
fixed effects, and the years when the farm was observed: 
𝑦𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑦𝑖,𝑠 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1(ln𝑃𝐴𝑖,𝑡 − ln𝑃𝐴𝑖,𝑠) + 𝑿𝑖,𝑠𝜽𝑥 + 𝑻𝑖,𝑠𝜽1 + 𝑻𝑖,𝑡𝜽2 + 𝜈𝑐(𝑖) + 𝜂𝑖𝑡,  (1) 
where 𝑦𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑦𝑖,𝑠 is the change in the production variable for farm 𝑖 between the first year the 
farm was observed 𝑠 and the second year 𝑡 (or in the case of farms observed three or more times, 
the second and third time and so forth). To measure the allocation of land to crops, we look at the 
share of total acres operated that are harvested; to capture crop specialization, we use the share of 
total acres harvested accounted for by the most harvested crop. For fertilizer and chemical use, 
we look at the log of fertilizer expenses per acre, the log of chemical expenses per acre, and the 
log of the sum of fertilizer and chemical expenses per acre. To capture overall intensity of land 
use, we use the log of the value of production per acre. 
 We measure crop insurance coverage using the premium paid per acre of land operated 
(𝑃𝐴𝑖,𝑡). Many prior studies used a binary variable to indicate whether a farmer had any acres 
enrolled in crop insurance (Horowitz and Lichtenberg, 1993; Smith and Goodwin, 1996; Wu, 
1999). Conditional on having some acres enrolled, this approach does not capture increases in 
the number of acres enrolled or the level of coverage chosen for enrolled acres. More recent 
work has used the share of total acres enrolled in crop insurance (Walters et al., 2012; Chang and 
Mishra, 2012). But as Goodwin, Vandeveer, and Deal (2004) note, such a measure ignores 
changes in coverage levels on enrolled acres.  
 Our measure of coverage, in contrast, captures changes in acres enrolled and coverage 
levels. Because coverage is expressed as premiums per acre operated by the farm, the measure 
increases with the share of acreage enrolled in crop insurance. It also increases with the level of 
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coverage chosen for enrolled acres since farmers pay higher premiums for higher coverage 
levels. The measure is similar to that of Goodwin, Vandeveer, and Deal (2004), who use a 
measure of total liabilities, since premiums are proportional to the liabilities covered by the 
insurance policy. Our premium-based measure of coverage is well-suited to our empirical goal of 
quantifying how an increase in crop insurance coverage–whether from enrolling more acres or 
selecting higher coverage levels or both–affects farm decisions.  
 The vector 𝑋𝑖,𝑠 contains farm-specific characteristics observed in the first year of the 
difference in the dependent variable (subscript s in equation (1)). Controlling for initial 
characteristics allows farms managed by young versus old farmers, for example, to have 
different growth trends, and avoids the potential for reverse causality that comes with using 
changes in characteristics. We control for the initial level of crop insurance coverage as 
measured by (unlogged) premiums per acre. To capture farm size and life cycle effects we 
include a linear and quadratic term for both the farm operator age and the initial total value of 
production. To account for differences in crop specialization, we control for the initial share of 
harvested acres accounted for by soybeans, corn, and wheat, all separately. Including the share of 
acres in each of these major crops helps control for any effect that crop rotation patterns may 
have on changes in insurance coverage and input decisions. As we will show, our conclusions 
are robust to excluding the farm-level control variables.    
 The vector 𝑇𝑖𝑠 contains binary variables indicating the first year of the differenced 
dependent variable; the variables in 𝑇𝑖𝑡 indicate the second year. These year dummy variables 
control for shocks unique to those years and that affect the change observed over the time 
spanned by the two years. This controls for confounding macroeconomic factors correlated with 
crop insurance coverage and our outcomes. For example, coverage generally increased over time 
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along with corn prices, which would lead to an increase in the value of production per acre, or, 
similarly, an increase in fertilizer use per acre.   
 The term  𝜈𝑐(𝑖) is a county fixed effect. It captures any change in behavior common to all 
sample farms from the same county. It therefore controls for local unobserved conditions such as 
the possibility that changing crop prices encouraged agricultural intensification in some areas 
more than others because of differences in land suitability. On average there are about 6 sample 
farms per county.  
 
2.2 Identification 
Prior studies of crop insurance and production decisions that do not control for farm fixed effects 
(e.g. Horowitz and Lichtenberg, 1993; Smith and Goodwin, 1996) likely suffer from omitted 
variable bias caused by unobserved farm characteristics correlated with farm decisions and 
insurance participation. By relating differences in farm-level outcomes with differences in 
coverage, the specification in (1) accounts for time-invariant farm characteristics that affect the 
outcome in an additive manner.  
 Controlling for farm fixed effects may nonetheless be inadequate to identify the causal 
effect of crop insurance participation on farm decisions. Any factor causing a shift in land use 
towards input-intensive insurable crops could create a spurious correlation between input use and 
insurance coverage. OLS would give biased results in other plausible scenarios as well.
2
 
                                                          
2
 Another example where OLS would give biased results is where in absence of insurance farmers use few inputs on 
marginal land and many inputs on high-quality land. With an insurance program, farmers might only get coverage 
for marginal land, which could encourage them to use as much inputs on the marginal land as they do on the high-
quality land. Suppose that much of the variation in premiums over time is based on farmers replacing marginal land 
with high-quality land, which causes premiums to decrease, or vice versa, which causes premiums to increase. In 
every instance where such replacing occurs, premiums change in a way that is uncorrelated with input use on the 
average acre. The first difference model estimated with OLS uses all of this variation in premiums in the estimation, 
which would bias the coefficient on premiums towards zero. 
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Appropriately estimating the effect of insurance coverage requires temporal variation in 
coverage unrelated to the decision to expand or intensify crop production.  
Our instrumental variable identification strategy leverages two facts: first, as previously 
discussed, the incentive for farmers to adopt more insurance increased over time and second, the 
federal crop insurance program has always had a maximum coverage level (85 percent for an 
individual level policy; 90 percent for an area-based policy). The growing incentive to expand 
coverage and the presence of a maximum coverage level suggests a negative nonlinear 
relationship between a) a farmer’s initial coverage relative to the maximum coverage possible, 
and b) the change in coverage in response to incentives to have more insurance. This nonlinear 
relationship is because farmers who initially had coverage close to the maximum coverage were 
substantially more limited in how much they could expand coverage compared to farmers who 
initially had less coverage. 
 To illustrate, consider an increase in the demand for insurance from period 1 to period 2 
caused perhaps by a drop in the price of insurance. Greater demand will result in more coverage 
for most farms, and premiums per acre in period 2 will increase relative to premiums per acre in 
period 1 (Figure 2). How much premiums increase in the second period depends on the farmer’s 
initial coverage. A farmer paying the maximum premium in the first period cannot increase 
coverage in response to the lower price of insurance, which is why the ratio of the second and 
first period premium equals one when the first period premium equals the maximum premium. A 
farm with a low premium in the first period, in contrast, may double or triple coverage. This is 
shown in Figure 2 by the negative nonlinear relationship between the ratio of the period 1 
premium to the maximum premium possible in period 1 (horizontal axis) and the ratio of the 
second period premium to first period premium (vertical axis). 
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 The relationship in Figure 2 has a firm microeconomic foundation. Consider two risk-
averse farmers who seek a specific level of risk exposure. The farmers can reach their desired 
risk exposure through a combination of risk-reducing practices (“diversification”) and insurance. 
The combinations of diversification and insurance that yield the same risk exposure constitute an 
indifference curve for each farmer. The price of insurance relative to the price of diversification 
(e.g. the cost of risk-reducing practices) determines the cost-effective mix of diversification and 
insurance. Further assume that the maximum coverage constraint binds for one farmer and not 
the other (perhaps because of a greater aversion to risk and therefore a greater demand for 
insurance).  
Consider an increase in premium subsidies, which causes the price of insurance to decline 
relative to the price of diversification. The constrained farmer cannot increase the quantity of 
insurance and, assuming that his preferred risk exposure has not changed, he has no incentive to 
change his use of diversification. In contrast, the change in relative prices causes the 
unconstrained farmer to use less diversification and more insurance, a shift associated with an 
increase in premiums relative to the constrained farmer. Moreover, the percent change in 
coverage increases exponentially the further the farmer’s initial insurance level is from the 
maximum level (see the online appendix for a detailed explanation, a graphical illustration, and a 
treatment of the case where increased profit variability increases the demand for a reduction in 
risk). 
Following the logic of Figure 2, let the relationship between the rate of increase in 
coverage and the initial coverage level can be described with an exponential function of the 
form: 
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𝑃𝐴𝑖,𝑡
𝑃𝐴𝑖,𝑠
= (
𝑃𝐴𝑖.𝑠
𝑀𝑎𝑥 𝑃𝐴𝑖,𝑠
)
𝜙
 ,      (2) 
where 𝜙 is presumably negative. Taking logs of both sides gives 
  ln(𝑃𝐴𝑖,𝑡) − ln (𝑃𝐴𝑖,𝑠) = 𝜙ln (
𝑃𝐴𝑖.𝑠
𝑀𝑎𝑥 𝑃𝐴𝑖,𝑠
).     (3) 
 Equation (3) motivates using an instrumental variable approach to estimate (1), where the 
log of the initial premium divided by the maximum premium, which we call the coverage ratio, 
is used as an instrument for the log difference in coverage as measured by premiums per acre. 
The first stage in this IV regression is then: 
ln(𝑃𝐴𝑖,𝑡) − ln(𝑃𝐴𝑖,𝑠) = 𝛾 + 𝜙ln (
𝑃𝐴𝑖.𝑠
𝑀𝑎𝑥 𝑃𝐴𝑖,𝑠
) + 𝑿𝑖,𝑠𝜹𝑥 + 𝑻𝑖,𝑠𝜹1 + 𝑻𝑖,𝑡𝜹2 + 𝜈𝑐(𝑖) + 𝜀𝑖𝑡.      (4) 
 We calculate the coverage ratio by dividing the initial per acre premium paid by the 
farmer by his maximum premium. The maximum premium–and therefore maximum coverage–
varies by county and crop mix. We calculate the maximum using producer premium data from 
the Risk Management Agency’s Summary of Business data, which are county-level data 
aggregated from all individual policies issued in the county. We find the crop-specific plan and 
coverage level with the highest per‒acre premium in each year and each county. Then we 
multiply this maximum per-acre premium by the number of harvested acres of each crop for 
every farm. This gives the total premiums each farm would have paid, had it enrolled each crop 
in the most expensive plan observed in the county. We refer to this amount as the farm’s 
maximum premium.
3
 
                                                          
3
 While we call this a maximum premium it is calculated as the average premium per acre associated with the most 
expensive plan and coverage level observed in the county. For example, two farmers with the most expensive plan 
in the county may pay different premiums because of different claim histories. If these were the only two farmers 
with the most expensive plan, we would use the average of the two for the per acre premium associated with the 
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 The nonlinear relationship between the coverage ratio and changes in coverage allows for 
estimating 𝜙 while controlling for the initial premium per acre, 𝑃𝐴𝑖.𝑠, which is included in X.  
The instrument–the log of the coverage ratio–is not perfectly predicted by a linear relationship 
with the initial premium per acre. Note that the log of the ratio can be written as ln(𝑃𝐴𝑖.𝑠) −
ln (𝑀𝑎𝑥 𝑃𝐴𝑖,𝑠). Both terms have variation that is not fully predicted by a linear function of the 
farm’s initial premium per acre. First, the log of the maximum coverage, ln (𝑀𝑎𝑥 𝑃𝐴𝑖,𝑠), varies 
by county and year, causing the coverage ratio to differ for two farmers despite having the same 
initial level of coverage. Second, the non-linearity introduced by taking the natural logarithm 
provides another source of variation, since ln(𝑃𝐴𝑖.𝑠) and 𝑃𝐴𝑖.𝑠 are not perfectly correlated. This 
non-linearity is a product of the constraint imposed by policy. As shown by Figure 2, the 
maximum coverage level introduces a constraint that binds exponentially more for farmers as 
their initial coverage level approaches the maximum level. This non-linearity is confirmed by the 
data in Figure 3, which shows a negative linear relationship between the log of the coverage ratio 
and the log difference in premium per acre.  
 Our instrumental variable is plausibly exogenous to changes in farm decisions because it 
is statistically related to changes in coverage because of a policy constraint (the coverage limit) 
and changing policy and market conditions (more subsidies, program options, and higher crop 
and input prices). Moreover, the inclusion of the farm’s initial coverage level makes the model 
robust to a correlation between a farm’s initial coverage level and changes in the outcomes 
studied.  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
most expensive plan and coverage level. Also, note that this maximum is based on the most expensive insurance 
option chosen in a county, which may be different than the most expensive option available if that option is not 
selected by anyone in the county.   
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 More specifically, the IV estimator is likely to give more credible estimates than the OLS 
estimator because the change in premiums per acre predicted non-linearly by the coverage ratio 
should strip out much of the endogenous changes in premiums per acre. Consider a scenario 
where changing crop prices or farm finances encourage some farmers to shift land from low-
input, non-insurable uses to high-input, insurable crops. With the switch, farmers increase 
insurance coverage, so premiums per acre and input use per acre both increase. Because OLS 
uses all the variation in premiums for identification, every time such a switch happens, premiums 
change in a way that is spuriously correlated with input use. As long as the log of the coverage 
ratio imperfectly predicts such switching, the predicted change in premiums will contain less 
endogenous variation then the actual change.
4
   
 
2.3. Creating a Panel Data Set from the Agricultural Resource Management Survey 
Empirical research on the causal effects of U.S. agricultural and environmental policy has been 
constrained by a lack of farm-level panel data. The only nation-wide source of detailed and 
comprehensive farm-level data is the Agricultural Resource Management Survey (ARMS), 
which is a cross-sectional survey. The National Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS), which 
administers the survey, draws a new sample of farms each year, sampling roughly 30,000 farms 
out of a population of 2.1 million.
5
  
 Although designed as a repeated cross-sectional survey, farms surveyed more than once 
over the years can be identified and their records linked. If a simple random sample were drawn, 
                                                          
4
 It is possible for IV to be more biased than OLS even if the instrument is less correlated with the error term than 
the endogenous variable that it is instrumenting for. However, this becomes increasingly less likely to hold with a 
stronger instrument (more correlated with the endogenous variable problem). We note that our instrument is 
extremely strong, with a first-stage F-statistic in excess of a thousand. 
5
 For an overview of ARMS along with detailed documentation, visit www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/arms-farm-
financial-and-crop-production-practices. 
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the probability of observing the same farm twice would be very low. This is not the case with 
ARMS. The USDA definition of a farm is broad and, as a result, many farms in the population 
have little production. Because ARMS seeks to be an annual snapshot of the state of agriculture 
every year, small farms are undersampled while larger farms, where most production occurs, are 
oversampled. Having been conducted annually since 1996, the many years of ARMS samples 
combined with the oversampling of large farms has caused many farms to be surveyed two or 
more times.  
 Using the unique principal operator identifier, a number assigned to each farm that does 
not change over time, we identified all farms appearing at least twice in the ARMS. Because the 
survey questions necessary for our study were not present prior to 2000, we focus on the data 
sets from 2000 to 2013. Over this period, 202,127 distinct farms were sampled and responded to 
the survey, of which 16 percent, or 32,498 farms, appear at least twice (Table 1). Roughly 4 
percent of farms appear at least three times.  
 Farms appearing at least twice in ARMS, which we label repeat farms, are quite different, 
on average, from the typical ARMS respondent. Because larger farms are sampled with a higher 
probability, repeat farms tend to be larger farms. For each year of ARMS we compare the 
median value of production and acreage operated of all respondent farms with that of repeat 
farms observed for the first time in that year. We calculate the unweighted median since we are 
interested in comparing repeat farms with the typical ARMS respondent farm, not repeat farms 
with the general population. As expected the median repeat farm consistently has more acres and 
production than the median respondent farm (Table 2).  
 The oversampling of large farms arguably suits our purposes better than a sample 
representative of the U.S. farm population as defined by the USDA. We are not interested in the 
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observing the typical farm in the population, which‒because of the broad USDA farm definition‒
has little agricultural production and is unlikely to participate in federal crop insurance. For 
environmental and land use issues we are most interested in what happens to the typical acre. 
Because large farms account for most acres enrolled in crop insurance, a sample reflecting the 
large farm population provides more information on how crop insurance affects practices on the 
typical acre.  
 As this is the first study to construct a true panel data set using ARMS, there is value to 
documenting how repeat farms might differ from the typical respondent farm. We know that 
repeat farms are larger than the typical respondent farm, but if we control for farm size are the 
repeat farms similar to the typical respondent? To make this comparison, we draw a random 
subsample of ARMS respondent farms that is stratified to match the farm size distribution of 
repeat farms. We compare the two groups for a variety of characteristics other than farm size 
(provided in the appendix). In considering the comparability of treatment and control groups, 
Imbens and Wooldridge (2009) suggest that linear regression may be misleading when the 
normalized difference in group means is larger than 0.25 standard deviations. The largest 
difference we observe is 0.23 and the average absolute difference is 0.04, indicating substantial 
comparability across the two groups. We also make comparisons among farms meeting our 
sample criteria and find substantial comparability across the groups, with only one normalized 
difference exceeding 0.25. 
 
2.4 Sample farms 
We narrow our sample of repeat farms to those most relevant for studying the effects of crop 
insurance. We focus on farms that participated in federal crop insurance in at least one of the 
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years observed and whose primary outputs are insurance-eligible, which we define as farms 
where at least half of the value of production in the first year observed came from crop insurance 
eligible crops.
6
 This gives a sample of 6,681 repeat observations, the majority of which reflect 
unique farms because most sample farms are observed only twice and therefore account for one 
repeat observation (Table 1). To take full advantage of our panel data, we also included 
observations from farms observed three or more times. A farm observed three times contributes 
two observations to our sample, the difference from the first and second year observed and the 
difference between the second and third year observed. Excluding these farms has little effect on 
the results. 
  In the first year of each year-to-year difference, the average farm in the sample was 
operated by a 52 year old whose farm had nearly $854,000 in production or about $380 per acre 
(Table 3). The farm had 23 percent of its acres planted to corn, another 30 percent to soybeans, 
and 20 percent to wheat. It also harvested close to 85 percent of the acres it operated and had 
fertilizer expenses of $51 per acre and chemical expenses (e.g. herbicides and insecticides) of 
$45 per acre. All monetary amounts are in 2011 dollars. 
 A threat to our instrumental variable approach is that time-varying factors affected land 
and input use in a way that was non-linearly related to the initial coverage ratio. We cannot 
dismiss such a situation but we can compare the beginning-period values for land and input use 
for farms across coverage-ratio terciles. Farms with initially similar practices are arguably more 
likely to experience similar time-varying factors than farms with differing practices. Table 4 
shows that farms in the first tercile (low coverage ratios) harvested a larger share of their land 
                                                          
6
 We calculate the value of production of insurance–eligible crops by using the market value of the farm’s 
production of corn (for grain or silage), soybeans, cotton, sorghum (for grain or silage), barley, oats, wheat, and 
canola. These crops represented over 91 percent of all insured crops (excluding forage as a crop) in crop year 2014 
according to RMA Summary of Business data. 
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and used more inputs per acre than farms in the second and third terciles. The differences, 
however, are surprisingly small. As mentioned earlier, a normalized difference in means of 0.25 
standard deviations or less is often interpreted as indicating reasonably comparable groups 
(Imbens and Wooldridge, 2009). In comparing the first and the second tercile, the normalized 
difference is 0.13 on average and is always less than a quarter. When comparing the first and the 
third terciles, the average normalized difference is 0.14 and is greater than 0.25 for only one 
variable‒the share of harvested acres.  
 Figures 4a and 4b illustrate the geography of our sample and show that sample farms are 
spread throughout the major row-crop regions of the U.S. and that increases in insurance 
coverage were not confined to a particular region. Figure 4a shows counties shaded based on 
their quartile for the number of sample farms. The distribution of sample farms generally 
matches where substantial production of key row crops occurs (to use the Economic Research 
Service Farm Resource Regions: the Southern Seaboard, the Mississippi Portal, the Heartland, 
and the Northern Great Plains). Figure 4b depicts counties based on the average log difference in 
premiums per acre, with counties again shaded by quartiles. Counties with large increases in 
coverage are spread across the regions where sample farms are present. In another map, we also 
show that the distribution of low-coverage-ratio farms generally follows the distribution of all 
sample farms (see online appendix).  
 Given the unique nature of our panel, we assess the distribution of sample farms across 
years. We provide the number of farms observed in each year pairing, for example, the number 
of farms observed for the first time in 2000 and for the second time in 2003 (see online 
appendix). Farms are well distributed across years, with a farm most commonly observed two or 
three years apart. More than 11 percent of the sample was observed for the first time in 2000, 
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prior to the implementation of the 2000 Farm Act that increased subsidies. Similarly, 68 percent 
were observed for the first time prior to the large increase in crop prices in 2007 (and therefore 
also before the implementation of the 2008 Act). 
2.5 Weighting, Standard errors, and Zeros 
The sample statistics are based on unweighted data. The ARMS uses a stratified sampling design 
and each observation has a weight based on its probability of selection. In the typical cross-
sectional use of ARMS data the weights permit using sample data to estimate population values 
such as the income of the average U.S. farm. Because ARMS is designed to create a nationally 
representative cross-section of farms rather than a panel of farms, the weights associated with 
repeat farms do not expand to a meaningful population. We therefore ignore the weights in 
estimation.  
 Researchers using ARMS normally account for sample design in estimating variances 
using a jackknife method with replicate weights provided by the USDA/NASS (e.g., Katchova, 
2005; Ahearn et al., 2006). This is an unattractive option because the replicate weights (like the 
base weights) are designed uniquely for each cross-sectional sample, not for the subsample of 
repeat farms. Facing a similar problem of needing to account for sample design without using 
weights, Weber and Clay (2013) cluster standard errors by each farm’s survey stratum or 
location. The intuition is clear–clustering by stratum amounts to summing variances from 
mutually exclusive and exhaustive subpopulations. They show that clustering by strata or by 
location gives standard errors of similar magnitude, both of which are about two-thirds larger 
than the unclustered errors. Because we use county fixed effects, we cluster our standard error by 
county. The robustness section considers using crop reporting district fixed effects and clustering 
errors by district.   
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 Because farms sometimes have zero insurance coverage in one of the years observed, our 
key dependent variable, the log difference in premiums per acre, is undefined for about a quarter 
of sample of farms. We take the common, though arbitrary, approach of adding a very small 
number to observations with a zero premium. To allow for a discrete effect of this arbitrary fix, 
we include in all models a dummy variable for whether the farm had a zero premium in the first 
year observed and another one for whether it had a zero premium in the second year observed. In 
the robustness section we present results for when these observations are excluded.  
 
3. RESULTS 
3.1 Ordinary Least Squares 
Estimating equation (4) with OLS suggests that greater insurance coverage encourages farms to 
cultivate and harvest a larger share of their acres and use more fertilizer and chemicals per acre 
(Table 5). A 10 percent increase in insurance coverage (measured by premiums per acre) is 
associated with a 0.11 percentage point increase in the share of acres harvested and a 0.44 
percent increase in fertilizer and chemical expenses. Unsurprisingly, the value of production per 
acre also increases with greater coverage.  
 Qualitatively, these first-differenced OLS results fit the farm-level cross-sectional 
findings of Horowitz and Lichtenberg (1993) and Chang and Mishra (2012) as well as the 
county-level panel data findings from Goodwin, Vandeveer, and Deal (2004), all of which show 
a positive association between insurance and fertilizer and chemical use. Yet, as highlighted 
before, such correlations may reflect unobserved factors that encourage a farmer to both intensify 
production and expand coverage.   
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3.2 Instrumental Variable Approach 
Figure 2 depicts the hypothesized nonlinear relationship between the initial coverage ratio and 
the ratio of the second and first period premium. Using the sample data, we plot the actual 
linearized relationship as described by equation (3) (Figure 3). The slope of the line corresponds 
to 𝜙 in equation (3). It is negative as predicted: farmers with a larger log coverage ratio had a 
smaller proportional change in premiums per acre. The line runs through the point (0,0), which 
corresponds to the point (1,1) in the hypothesized nonlinear relationship in Figure 2.  
 We more formally establish the strength of the excluded instrument, the log of the 
coverage ratio, by estimating equation (4). A first-stage regression for the full sample shows that 
a 1 percent increase in the logged ratio was associated with 0.73 percent less growth in premiums 
per acre (coefficient of 0.724, standard error of 0.022) (Table 6). The F statistic for whether the 
coefficient on the logged ratio is zero is above 1,100, far higher than the thresholds provided in 
Stock and Yogo (2005) for the reliability of t-tests based on IV estimates and for a sufficiently 
low probability that the bias of the IV point estimates is less than 10 percent of the bias of OLS.  
 In contrast to the OLS estimator, the Instrumental Variable estimator shows that crop 
insurance slightly decreases the share of acres harvested and has little effect on input use (Table 
7). Compared to the statistically significant coefficients in the OLS regressions, the IV 
coefficients are multiple times smaller and yet with standard errors of roughly similar magnitude. 
OLS, for example, gives a coefficient of 0.044 on the change in premiums when looking at total 
fertilizer and chemical expenditures while the IV estimate is only 0.011.  
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 The one case where both OLS and IV give similar results is for crop specialization. In 
both cases the coefficient is positive, but with point estimates that indicate economically 
insignificant effects: a 10 percent increase in crop insurance coverage leads to a 0.03 (OLS) to 
0.05 (IV) percentage point increase in the share of acres harvested dedicated to the most 
harvested crop. Only the IV estimate is statistically distinguishable from zero.  
 
3.3 Robustness 
We perform nine robustness checks. The first six checks concern the general robustness of the 
results. The seventh and eight checks relate to heterogeneous effects and external validity. The 
ninth check address concerns about measurement error in premiums per acre.  
 First, we drop the farm characteristic control variables and only control for county and 
year fixed effects and the zero-premium indicator variables. If our instrument, the log of the 
coverage ratio, were substantially correlated with farm characteristics that affect our outcomes, 
we would expect large changes in our estimates. Sensitivity to controlling for observed 
characteristics, in turn, would suggest that estimates may also be sensitive to unobservable 
characteristics correlated with our instrument. Second, we exclude farms that had a zero 
premium in one year and for which we added a small number to the premium to permit taking 
the log. Third, instead of including a dummy variable for the first year observed and another 
dummy variable for the second year observed, we include a dummy variable for each unique 
year pairing (e.g. 2002 for year 1 and 2007 for year 2).  This provides a general robustness check 
on our approach to controlling for time shocks. It also controls for a modification in the 
calculation of premiums made in the 2008 Farm Act, which could cause a shift in premiums for 
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farms observed before and after 2008.
7
 Fourth, we control for the number of years between the 
first and the second observation. This helps address concerns about survivor bias as it allow for a 
correlation between years of survival and changes in farm decisions. Fifth, to address concerns 
that varying time lengths used in differencing may affect our results, we limit estimation to farms 
observed 3 to 5 years apart, which reduces our sample size by about two-thirds. Sixth, we use 
crop reporting district fixed effects and cluster our standard errors at the district level. Crop 
reporting districts are groupings of roughly 10 agriculturally similar counties.  
 The results are surprisingly stable across the first six robustness checks (Table 8). 
Controlling for farm characteristics provides economically small and statistically insignificant 
coefficients for all outcomes. There is a change in statistical significance compared to the main 
results for the share harvested and the maximum share in one group, but even these main results 
were economically small. Excluding farms with zero premiums gives point estimates very 
similar to the main estimates. Likewise, including dummy variables for year pairings, including a 
length of time elapsed variable, limiting estimation to farms observed 3 to 5 years apart, or using 
crop reporting district fixed effects all provide results similar to the main results. 
 The seventh and eight checks address the applicability of the estimates of the response to 
greater crop insurance (𝛽1in equation 1) to the broader population of crop farms growing 
insurance-eligible crops. Almost all farm-level empirical studies of crop insurance assume that 
conditional on covariates, the behavioral response to crop insurance coverage is the same for all 
sample farms (Quiggin, Karagiannis, and Stanton, 1993; Horowitz and Lichtenberg, 1993; Smith 
                                                          
7
Prior to 2008, total premiums were mandated to be priced to generate a loss-ratio of 1.075. The 2008 Farm Act 
mandated that total premiums should be priced to generate a ratio of 1.0 (actuarially fair). Including dummy 
variables for each unique year pairing will control for this change in policy. For information on the change, see 
Dennis Shields, “Federal Crop Insurance: Background and Issues,” Congressional Research Service, Dec 2010, 
footnote 16, p12. 
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and Goodwin, 1996; Wu, 1999; O’Donoghue, Roberts, and Key, 2009). Endogeneity issues 
aside, assuming a homogenous behavioral response, and therefore the same coefficient across 
farms, OLS gives a consistent point estimate of this coefficient when using a simple random 
sample as well as when using a sample where large farms are oversampled, such as the normal 
ARMS sample or the repeat sample that we have constructed. If there are heterogeneous 
responses, weighted or unweighted OLS will not provide a consistent estimate of the populated-
share-weighted average response, regardless of the sample design (see p. 67-70 in Deaton, 1997). 
The only solution to estimate interpretable coefficients is to simply estimate different equations 
(or at least different coefficients) based on each farm group for which the behavioral response is 
unique.   
 The key issue for applying our results more broadly, then, is whether small and large 
farms, for example, have a fundamentally different response to crop insurance, in which case a 
distinct coefficient should be estimated for each type of farm. A reasonable test of the 
assumption of a homogenous response is to estimate separate equations for different types of 
sample farms. We do this on two dimensions: crop specialization and farm size. For crop 
specialization, we split the sample based on how much corn a farm had in its original crop mix, 
with corn farms categorized as those where 25 percent or more of the value of production comes 
from corn. For farm size, we split the sample based into small and large farms based on having 
more or less acreage than the median farm. 
 When splitting the sample, the estimated coefficient on the change in premiums is 
statistically indistinguishable from zero 22 out of the 24 times (four samples multiplied by six 
outcomes) (Table 8). The actual coefficients are generally statistically similar across subsamples 
as well. For farms specialized in corn, the 95 percent confidence interval for the coefficient on 
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the change in premiums contains the coefficient estimated for farms not specialized in corn five 
out of six times. Similarly, for large farms, the confidence interval contains the point estimate for 
small farms five out of six times. Thus, the overall results suggest that greater crop insurance 
coverage has little effect on farm behavior and that this is true for different types of farms.  
 The one statistically strong and economically large result from the sample is for the value 
of production per acre on small farms. However, this was not associated with greater input use. 
One interpretation is that insurance encourages smaller farmers to switch to higher value crops 
that require more investment but not more fertilizer or pesticide.  
  The final robustness check addresses concerns about measurement error in our measure 
of crop insurance coverage, the change in premiums per acre. Although our measure has 
advantages over past measures, it is still open to improvement. Ideally we would use the total 
premium per acre (the combined farmer and government-paid premium), which is not collected 
in the Agricultural Resource Management Survey. The total premium would provide a more 
precise measure of the change in coverage for farms observed before and after the 2008 Farm 
Act, which changed subsidy rates for farms selecting policies involving enterprise units.  
 For farms where both observations occur in the 2001 to 2007 window, the percent change 
in the farmer premium equals the percent change in the total premium since the relationship 
between the two was fixed by law during this period. We exploit this fact to explore the 
possibility of attenuation bias from measurement error and find little indication that measurement 
error is a problem. If it were a problem, OLS estimates for the change in premiums in equation 
(1), 𝛽1, should be larger when using only farms observed for the first and second time between 
2001 and 2007. Yet, we find estimates of 𝛽1that are similar to or smaller than those from the full 
sample where measurement error is presumably greater (see online appendix). 
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4. DISCUSSION   
4.1 Can We Reject Economically Important Effects?  
In many instrumental variable applications, large standard errors can prevent a rejection of the 
null hypothesis of a zero effect but, at the same time, not allow researchers to rule out 
economically important effect sizes. This is not the case for our results, where even the upper 
bound estimated effects are economically small. Table 9 presents the upper bound on the 95 
percent confidence interval for the effect of crop insurance on each outcome (column 2). For 
sample farms, premiums per acre doubled from 2000 to 2013 in real terms, going from $6 to $12 
dollars per acre. This is also true for all participating farms as calculated from the 2000 and 2013 
cross sections of the ARMS. A doubling of premiums would translate into a 0.7 increase in the 
log premium per acre (ln(12/6)). In column 3, we multiply this change in log premiums by our 
upper bound estimate.  
 The upper bound estimate of the effect of a doubling of crop insurance coverage on the 
share of land harvested is zero. The effect on the maximum share of land in one crop is larger: a 
0.8 percentage point increase, which translates to less than one additional acre allocated to the 
most planted crop in a 100 acre farm. The upper bound estimate of the effect on the value of 
production is slightly larger, at 2.2 percent, though this is still an economically small effect.  
 For fertilizer and chemical use, we draw from existing studies to translate an upper bound 
estimate of use into a percent increase in externality. For fertilizer, our upper bound estimate 
suggests that doubling coverage would cause a 1.3 percent increase in fertilizer nutrients leaving 
the field (column 5 of Table 8). This estimate comes from multiplying our upper bound estimate 
of the increase in fertilizer expenses (1.9 percent) with the estimate of fertilizer loss from Li et al. 
(2006). They found that a 1 percent increase in the fertilizer application rate on Iowa corn and 
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soybean fields leads to a 0.7 percent increase in nutrients in water flowing in tiles that drain 
agricultural areas, which would likely result in an even smaller percentage increase in nutrients 
in larger streams (column 4 in Table 8).
8
 It is reasonable to apply these numbers to our study, 
which has many Midwestern corn and soybean farms, and assume that a 1 percent increase in 
fertilizer expenses per acre would translate into a similar increase in the fertilizer application 
rate.   
 The implied (upper-bound) elasticity between crop insurance coverage and fertilizer loss 
is 0.013 (=1.3/100). By comparison, Hendricks et al. (2014) find an elasticity between corn 
prices and nitrogen loss of 0.074, almost six times the effect of doubling crop insurance 
coverage. 
 Our finding for chemical usage suggests an upper bound increase of pesticides in nearby 
waterways of 1.1 percent. The most common component of chemical expenditures is pesticides. 
Using data from the National Water Quality Assessment program, Tesfamichael et al. (2005) 
estimate that a 1 percent increase in the application rate of atrazine led to a 0.5 percent increase 
in the concentration of atrazine in streams. (Atrazine is a commonly used pesticides and was the 
second most commonly found pesticide in a nation-wide survey by the EPA (U.S. EPA, 1990)). 
Our upper-bound estimate suggests that a doubling of crop insurance premiums would cause a 
1.9 percent increase in chemical expenses. Supposing the increase in chemical expenses is 
associated with a similar increase in quantity of pesticide applied, our estimate multiplied by that 
of Tesfamichael et al. (2005) suggests a 1.1 percent (=2.2 percent x 0.5 percent) increase in the 
concentration of pesticide in streams.  
 
                                                          
8
 Gowda, Mulla, and Jaynes (2008) also conduct a farm level study in the Midwest and find a similar result: a 1 
percent decrease in the fertilizer rate was associated with a 0.85% decline in nitrate losses.  
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4.2 What Our Empirics Do and Do Not Capture  
Our measures of fertilizer and chemical use are per acre operated by the farm. It is possible that 
insurance subsidies caused marginal lands to be brought into cultivation. If the land was 
originally part of the farm (e.g. in pasture) and crop insurance encouraged the farmer to convert 
it to cropland, we would observe increases in the value of production per acre, the share of land 
harvested, and fertilizer and chemical expenses per acre. If, however, crop insurance encouraged 
the farm to acquire the land, our outcome variables would only increase if the farmer used more 
fertilizer on it (or had a more specialized crop mix and so forth) than the average acre already 
operated by the farm. Otherwise, we would not capture the effect. 
 We do not know how land acquired between the first and second time observed may have 
differed from land already in the farm. But we can test if crop insurance was association with 
farms acquiring more land. Using the log difference in the total acres operated as the dependent 
variable, we find that greater insurance coverage was not associated with an increase in acres 
operated (coefficient of -0.01, standard error of 0.007). This result combined with the lack of an 
effect on the value of production suggests that insurance did not cause participating farmers to 
intensify production on marginal lands.  
 Still, it is possible that both high and low-coverage farms acquired land at similar rates, 
with farms with high coverage tending to acquire marginal lands (and intensify production on 
them) while low coverage farms tended to acquire better lands. However, this would require that 
high coverage farmers replaced high quality land with marginal land such that the total acres 
operated did not change, which seems unlikely. 
 Our empirics capture the effect of expanding crop insurance coverage in a period when 
other farm programs changed very little. We do not examine the effects of replacing any 
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particular farm program with crop insurance. Over our study period, crop insurance premium 
subsidies and plans increased while the main farm income support program, the Direct Payment 
program, remained in place, paying around $5 billion each year to qualified farmers. Shortly 
after our study period, however, Congress passed the 2014 Farm Act, repealing the Direct 
Payment program in favor of strengthening crop insurance. The shift in programs will likely 
have minor environmental consequences. Weber and Key (2012) present evidence that the Direct 
Payment program did not affect production or harvested acreage. And although farmers had to 
comply with conservation provisions to receive payments, with the 2014 Act Congress 
transferred similar provisions to crop insurance. To be eligible for premium subsidies, the 
provisions require that farmers with highly erodible land or wetlands maintain conservation 
practices in line with National Resources Conservation Service guidelines. 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
Policies with non-environmental goals can cause unintended environmental harm. Using a novel 
data set and identification strategy, we find that federal crop insurance does not appear to fall 
into this category despite several past studies suggesting otherwise. Farmers who expanded crop 
insurance coverage during the 2000 to 2013 period had changes in land use, crop mix, and 
fertilizer and chemical use similar to farmers with smaller or no changes in coverage. Our 
finding is striking because the changes in crop prices over the period caused farmers to plant 
more corn, a high value and input intensive crop. One may have expected increasingly generous 
insurance subsidies to have accentuated this shift.  
 Although our results are based on the 2000-2013 period, they arguably hold under the 
2014 Farm Act in which policymakers linked premium subsidies to conservation compliance on 
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erodible lands or wetlands. Our findings of small effects of crop insurance coverage on farmer 
decisions combined with the recent linking to conservation requirements suggest that the federal 
crop insurance program should not have substantial negative environmental implications moving 
forward. 
 Looking beyond crop insurance, our panel data set of nearly 32,500 distinct farms in the 
2000-2013 period lends itself to studying a wide range of agro-environmental issues and their 
links with program participation and farm household finances and characteristics. As the panel 
expands with each passing year, it will aid in studying the effects of the shifts in farm and 
conservation policy that occurred in the 2014 Farm Act including the reduction of the 
Conservation Reserve Program, the re-linking of insurance premium subsidies to conservation 
compliance, and the elimination of the direct payment program. 
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Figures 
 
 
Figure 1. Enrolled Acres and Total Premium Subsidies, 1989-2013. The figure was 
elaborated by the authors using data are from the U.S. Department of Agriculture, Risk 
Management Agency, Summary of Business. Enrolled acres correspond to the number of acres 
enrolled in a plan beyond the basic catastrophic level. Premium subsidies refer to those subsidies 
applied to acres enrolled in a plan beyond the basic catastrophic level. Premium subsidies are in 
2009 dollars. 
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Figure 2. The Initial Coverage Ratio and the Response to Greater Incentives for Insurance 
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Figure 3. The Log of the Initial Coverage Ratio is Negatively Related to the Change in 
Coverage. The line represents the results of a kernel-weighted local polynomial regression of the 
log difference in coverage on the log of the initial coverage ratio. For the figure, the log of the 
coverage ratio is truncated at -6, and only observations with nonzero premiums are used.  
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Figure 4a. Sample Farms Are Distributed Across the Major Row-Crop Regions 
 
 
Figure 4b. Counties with High Growth in Coverage Are Spread Across Regions  
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Tables 
Table 1. How Often is the Same Farm Observed in ARMS?  
 
Number of Times Observed Farms Percent of Distinct Farms Observed 
1 169,629 84  
2 25,548 13  
3 5,449 3 
4 1,239 1 
5 230 <0.1 
6 24 <0.1 
7 8 <0.1 
Total 202,127 100 
Source.‒ The USDA, Economic Research Service and USDA, National Agricultural Statistics Service, Agricultural 
Resource Management Survey (ARMS), 2000-2013. 
Note.‒ The data are from The percents in the third column do not add to 100 because of rounding. 
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Table 2. How Do Repeat Farms Compare to the Typical ARMS Respondent Farm? 
 
  
Farms  
(number of) 
Acres Operated 
(median acres) 
Value of Production 
(median $) 
Year Repeat  All Repeat  All Repeat All 
2000 2,862 9,863 748 440 382,148 151,126 
2001 1,999 7,343 840 416 474,014 131,190 
2002 2,925 11,926 720 397 367,400 114,503 
2003 4,398 17,782 620 395 320,628 142,233 
2004 4,376 19,468 445 300 369,739 133,307 
2005 4,213 21,564 412 250 339,560 105,583 
2006 3,584 20,351 466 264 355,012 125,529 
2007 2,314 17,465 650 360 560,727 239,878 
2008 2,126 20,469 576 340 435,519 153,940 
2009 1,700 19,877 450 300 292,288 111,103 
2010 1,242 20,661 400 250 258,473 100,000 
2011 661 19,441 300 280 300,694 181,221 
2012 98 20,561 555 323 159,123 147,634 
All 
Years
* 32,498 243,378 550 310 369,834 135,293 
Source.‒ The USDA, Economic Research Service and USDA, National Agricultural Statistics Service, Agricultural 
Resource Management Survey (ARMS), 2000-2013. 
Note.‒ “All Years” contains 2013 data in the “All” categories while there is no row for 2013 since any repeat farms 
would, by definition, have to have been observed prior to 2013. 
 
 
  
45 
 
Table 3. Descriptive Statistics for the Sample Used in Estimation 
        
Variable Mean S.D. Median 
 
Farm characteristics  
Operator age 52 11 52 
Off-farm income 44,600 116,000 26,250 
Value of production 854,000 1,508,000 489,000 
Wheat acres to total acres harvested 0.2 0.31 0.01 
Corn acres to total acres  harvested 0.23 0.25 0.14 
Soybean acres to total acres harvested 0.3 0.27 0.32 
Change in premium per acre 2.48 11.2 1.2 
Change in log premium per acre 0.31 3.8 0.28 
Premium per acre in 2000 6.17 7.86 3.7 
Premium per acre in 2013 11.3 11.59 8.64 
 
Farm outcomes  
Share of acres harvested 0.84 0.25 0.92 
Max share accounted for by one crop 0.42 0.36 0.35 
Value of production per acre 382 281 331 
Fertilizer expenses per acre 51 47 40 
Chemical expenses per acre 45 42 32 
Fertilizer and chemical expenses per acre 96 77 78 
Source.‒ The USDA, Economic Research Service and USDA, National Agricultural Statistics Service, Agricultural 
Resource Management Survey (ARMS), 2000-2013. The descriptive statistics are for farms meeting the sample criteria as 
described in the text. 
Note.‒ The farm-level statistics are based on the first year the farm was observed. There are a total of 6,681 
observations in the full sample used in our analysis. The premium per acre statistics are based only on farms 
observed for the first time in the reference year (n=752 for 2000 and n =1,199 for 2013). Monetary amounts are in 
2011 dollars.
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Table 4. Farms in Different Coverage-Ratio Terciles Had Similar Initial Levels of the Dependent Variables 
                      
 
Coverage Ratio Tercile  
(Mean Ratio)  
    
 
Tercile 1 
(0.04)  
Tercile 2 
 (0.28) 
Tercile 3  
(0.82) Tercile 2 vs. Tercile 1 Tercile 3 vs. Tercile 1 
Variables at Initial Period Values Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Diff. Norm. Diff. Diff. Norm. Diff. 
Share of acres harvested 0.88 0.23 0.84 0.25 0.78 0.28 -0.04 -0.11 -0.10 -0.29 
Max share accounted for by one crop 0.42 0.34 0.38 0.36 0.47 0.37 -0.05 -0.10 0.04 0.08 
ln(Value of production/acre) 5.80 0.76 5.67 0.83 5.57 0.95 -0.13 -0.11 -0.23 -0.19 
ln(Fertilizer expenses/acre) 3.67 0.92 3.56 0.95 3.55 1.01 -0.11 -0.08 -0.12 -0.08 
ln(Chemical expenses/acre) 3.60 1.03 3.28 1.06 3.30 1.11 -0.32 -0.22 -0.30 -0.20 
ln(Fertilizer and chemical expenses/acre) 4.38 0.89 4.17 0.93 4.17 0.99 -0.21 -0.16 -0.21 -0.16 
Note.‒ The initial period values are based on the first year of each year-pair observation. The coverage ratio terciles are based on each farm’s initial 
coverage ratio (=initial premiums / premiums associated with maximum coverage). Monetary amounts are in 2011 dollars.  
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Table 5. OLS Estimates of the Effect of Crop Insurance Coverage  
              
  
Δ Share of 
acres 
harvested 
Δ Max share 
accounted for by 
one crop 
Δ ln(Value of 
prod. /acre)  
Δ ln(Fertilizer 
expenses/acre) 
Δ ln (Chemical 
expenses/acre)  
Δ ln(Fert. + chem. 
expenses/acre) 
Δ log premium per acre 0.011*** 0.003 0.033*** 0.039*** 0.044*** 0.044*** 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.006) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) 
Initial premium per acre 0.000 -0.000 0.000*** 0.000 0.000*** 0.000 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Control variables Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
County fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 6,681 6,543 6,574 6,368 6,341 6,574 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.024 0.189 0.112 0.092 0.030 0.085 
Note.‒ Robust standard errors clustered by county are in parenthesis. County and year fixed effects are included as well as all the control variables 
mentioned in the text (dummy variables indicating zero premiums in the first or second year observed; linear and quadratic terms for the age of the farm 
operator’s age and the farm’s total value of production; the initial share of harvested acres accounted for by soybeans, corn, and wheat, all separately).  Other 
than the share variables, the dependent variables are per acre operated by the farm. The different number of observations across regressions is from some farms 
not having positive values for the outcome variable in at least one year.  
*p < .10. 
** p < .05. 
*** p < .01
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Table 6. The Initial Coverage Ratio Is Negatively Correlated With Increases in Coverage 
  Δ log premium per acre 
Initial coverage ratio -0.724*** 
 
(0.022) 
Initial premium per acre -0.000* 
 
(0.000) 
Wheat acres to total acres harvested 0.189 
 
(0.135) 
Corn acres to total acres  harvested 0.019 
 
(0.138) 
Soybean acres to total acres harvested 0.535*** 
 
(0.142) 
Operator age 0.010 
 
(0.010) 
Operator age squared -0.000 
 
(0.000) 
Total off-farm income -0.000 
 
(0.000) 
Total value of production -0.000 
 
(0.000) 
Total value of production squared 0.000 
 
(0.000) 
Zero premium, first year -4.166*** 
 
(0.135) 
Zero premium, second year 8.363*** 
 
(0.071) 
Intercept -5.577*** 
  (0.446) 
County fixed effects Y 
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Year fixed effects Y 
Observations 6,681 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.90 
F Statistic on the coverage ratio 1,130 
Note.‒ ***,**,* indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels. Robust standard errors clustered by county are in parenthesis. 
*p < .10. 
** p < .05. 
*** p < .01
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Table 7. Instrumental Variable Estimates of the Effect of Crop Insurance Coverage 
              
  
Δ Share of 
acres 
harvested 
Δ Max share 
accounted for by 
one crop 
Δ ln(Value of 
prod. /acre)  
Δ ln(Fertilizer 
expenses/acre) 
Δ ln (Chemical 
expenses/acre)  
Δ ln(Fert. + chem. 
expenses/acre) 
Δ log premium per acre -0.007** 0.005** 0.014 -0.001 0.006 0.011 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.009) (0.014) (0.013) (0.010) 
Initial premium per acre -0.000 -0.000 0.000*** -0.000 0.000** 0.000 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Control variables Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
County fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 6,681 6,543 6,574 6,368 6,341 6,574 
Note.‒ Robust standard errors clustered by county are in parenthesis. County and year fixed effects are included as well as all the control variables 
mentioned in the text (dummy variables indicating zero premiums in the first or second year observed; linear and quadratic terms for the age of the farm 
operator’s age and the farm’s total value of production; the initial share of harvested acres accounted for by soybeans, corn, and wheat, all separately).   Other 
than the share variables, the dependent variables are per acre operated by the farm. The different number of observations across regressions is from some farms 
not having positive values for the outcome variable in at least one year. The first stage F statistic for the excluded instrument (Δ log premium per acre) is 
1,130. 
*p < .10. 
** p < .05. 
*** p < .01
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Table 8. The Robustness of the Estimates of the Effect of Insurance Coverage  
              
Sample/Specification 
Δ Share of 
acres 
harvested 
Δ Max share 
accounted for by 
one crop 
Δ ln(Value 
of prod. 
/acre)  
Δ ln(Fertilizer 
expenses/acre) 
Δ ln (Chemical 
expenses/acre)  
Δ ln(Fert. + chem. 
expenses/acre) 
Main results (for comparison) -0.007** 0.005** 0.014 -0.001 0.006 0.011 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.009) (0.014) (0.013) (0.010) 
Excluding farm covariates  -0.002 -0.000 -0.002 -0.002 0.001 0.004 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) 
Farms with positive premiums -0.009** 0.005 0.006 -0.011 0.009 0.001 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.010) (0.017) (0.015) (0.012) 
Year-pair dummy variables -0.007** 0.005* 0.014 0.002 0.007 0.013 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.009) (0.014) (0.013) (0.010) 
Add (year2 – year1) variable -0.007** 0.005** 0.014 -0.001 0.006 0.011 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.009) (0.014) (0.013) (0.010) 
Periods 3-5 years apart -0.003 0.003 0.018 0.000 -0.028 -0.007 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.018) (0.028) (0.028) (0.024) 
Crop reporting district -0.008** 0.004 0.005 0.001 0.001 0.008 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.011) (0.016) (0.012) (0.010) 
Farms specialized in corn  -0.004 -0.001 0.026 0.052* 0.021 0.033 
 
(0.006) (0.004) (0.019) (0.029) (0.028) (0.021) 
Farms not specialized in corn -0.008 0.006 0.017 -0.025 -0.012 -0.004 
 
(0.005) (0.004) (0.012) (0.021) (0.016) (0.014) 
Large farms -0.002 0.003 0.013 -0.005 0.006 0.015 
 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.011) (0.018) (0.019) (0.013) 
Small farms 0.001 0.003 0.077*** 0.003 -0.017 0.010 
  (0.007) (0.007) (0.019) (0.027) (0.028) (0.024) 
Note.‒ Robust standard errors clustered by county are in parenthesis. For the row “Full sample, excluding farm covariates”, only the zero-premium 
indicator variables and the county and year fixed effects are controlled for. The other regressions include county and year fixed effects as well as all the control 
variables mentioned in the text. Other than the share variables, the dependent variables are per acre operated by the farm. Specialization in corn farming is based 
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on having at least 25 percent of the farm’s value of production coming from corn. The large and small farm categories are based on being above or below the 
sample median acres operated. For all regressions, the first stage F statistic on the excluded instrument is well above thresholds for weak instrument bias.      
*p < .10. 
** p < .05. 
*** p < .01
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Table 9. The Economic Magnitude of Our Findings 
            
  
Point 
Estimate 
95 % CI Upper 
Bound 
Change for a 100% Increase 
in Premiums Per Acre (%) 
Elasticity of 
Contamination  
Increased Presence 
in Waterways (%) 
Share of acres harvested -0.007 -0.000 -0.0 - 
 Max share in one crop 0.005 0.011 0.8 - 
 Value of production  0.014 0.032 2.2 - 
 Fertilizer expenses  -0.001 0.027 1.9 0.7 1.3 
Chemical expenses  0.006 0.032 2.2 0.5 1.1 
Fertilizer and chemical expenses  0.011 0.031 2.2 -   
Note.‒ The doubling of premiums per acre is based on the observed change in premiums per acre from 2000 to 2013 (roughly $6 to $12 per acre). The 
results in column 3 are from multiplying column 2 by 0.70 (=ln(12/6)). For the share variables, the numbers in column 3 refer to the percentage point increase in 
the share (e.g. a 0.8 percentage point increase in the max share of one crop). The elasticity of contamination for fertilizer (column 4) is from Li et al. (2006) and 
represents the percent increase in nitrogen in tile drainage water for a percent increase in fertilizer application. The elasticity of contamination for chemical 
expenses refers to the percent increase in atrazine in waterways resulting from a one percent increase in atrazine application as estimated by Tesfamichael et al. 
(2005). Column 5 comes from multiplying column 3 with column 4.  
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Supplemental Online Appendix for  
“Does Federal Crop Insurance Make Environmental Externalities from Agriculture 
Worse?”  
 
SA1. The Microeconomic Foundations of Figure 2–A Graphical Explanation 
Figure SA1 depicts risk indifference curves for farmers A and B. Assume that both farmers seek 
to reach a particular level of risk exposure through the lowest-cost combination of risk-reducing 
practices (“diversification”) and insurance.9 The vertical axis indicates spending on risk-
reduction through diversification and the horizontal axis indicates spending on insurance. The 
slope of the isocost line is the price of insurance divided by the price of diversification (e.g. the 
cost of risk-reducing practices). Given a particular risk indifference curve (assumed to have the 
same shape for both farmers), these relative prices determine the mix of diversification and 
insurance used.  
We assume that farmer B seeks less risk exposure than farmer A, perhaps because of risk 
preferences or wealth. This puts farmer B on an indifference curve further from the origin, 
indicating less risk exposure and more spending on risk-reducing practices and insurance 
(DB>DA; IB>IA). We further assume that farmer B’s optimal insurance amount is beyond the 
maximum coverage level (IB> IMax).  
Consider an increase in premium subsidies, which lowers the price of insurance. The 
decline in price flattens the isocost curve, causing farmer A to use less diversification and more 
insurance (𝐷𝐴
′ < 𝐷𝐴, 𝐼𝐴
′ > 𝐼𝐴). Farmer B, in contrast, is constrained in the amount of insurance he 
                                                          
9
 The assumption that each farm has a targeted risk indifference curve allows us to abstract away from a full 
household utility maximization problem and focus on the mix of diversification and insurance used to achieve the 
targeted level of risk. While it is a strong assumption, it could be a reasonable approximation if farm households 
seek a risk level that rules out extreme outcomes such as defaulting on a loan, and once this risk level is achieved the 
household places little value on further reductions in risk.  
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can purchase, so is while his optimal unconstrained insurance level, indicated by stars, increases 
from  𝐼𝐵
∗  to 𝐼𝐵
∗′  his actual purchase remains at IMax (farmer B’s use of diversification will also not 
change as long as he does not change his preferred level risk exposure). Farmer A’s premiums 
increase relative to farmer B’s premiums since farmer B cannot increase his use of insurance. 
The empirical focus of the paper is whether farmer A’s shift away from diversification and 
towards insurance is associated with an increase in fertilizer use, chemical use, and so on. 
Consistent with Figure 2, the percent change in coverage in response to the subsidy increases 
exponentially the further the farmer’s initial insurance level is from the maximum level. In the 
example given, 𝐼𝐴
′ 𝐼𝐴⁄ > 𝐼𝑀𝑎𝑥 𝐼𝑀𝑎𝑥⁄ = 1 and 𝐼𝐴
′ 𝐼𝐴⁄  increases exponentially as 𝐼𝐴 decreases. 
The same framework can be used to explore an overall increase in profit variability, 
which causes the indifference curves for both farmers to shift outward by the same degree‒to 
obtain the same level of risk requires more insurance and/or diversification. The previous isocost 
line is now associated with an indifference curve with more risk exposure, requiring farmers to 
spend more–either on diversification or insurance–to reach the prior level of risk exposure 
(Figure SA2). Without limits on coverage and no changes in relative prices, both farmers would 
increase diversification and insurance proportionally (indicated by an outward shift in the isocost 
curve) and remain at a similar point of curvature on the indifference curve but on a new curve 
with the desired risk exposure. Because the coverage constraint binds for farmer B, he will hold 
constant the use of insurance but increase the use of diversification, moving up the indifference 
curve towards greater dependence on diversification. Farmer A, in contrast, increases the use of 
diversification and insurance and remains at the same point on the indifference curve. As before, 
premiums increase proportionally more for farmer A than for farmer B. The change corresponds 
to the replacing of insurance with diversification and fits the empirical focus of the paper, which 
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is whether farmer A’s shift away from diversification and towards insurance is associated with 
an increase in fertilizer use, chemical use, and so on. 
SA2. Comparing Repeat Farms to the Typical Respondent farm. 
The full sample of repeat farms is 32,498 (see Table 2 in the main text). For the purpose of broad 
conclusions about repeat farms, our comparison of repeat and respondent farms is based on the 
full sample of repeat farms, not the more narrow sample used for our analysis of crop insurance. 
We break the repeat farm sample into quartiles based on the value of production. There are 8,124 
repeat farms in the bottom quartile of the value of production, which is defined by having 
$116,075 or less in production. We then randomly draw the same number of farms among all 
respondent farms having $116,075 or less in production. We do this for the second, third, and 
fourth farm-size quartiles, thereby creating a subsample of ARMS respondent farms with a farm-
size distribution similar to that of the repeat farm sample.  
 For many quartiles, repeat and respondent farms have group means that are statistically 
different at the one percent level. But given the more than 16,000 observations in each quartile, a 
statistically significant difference is likely even if the difference is economically unimportant. 
The normalized difference–the difference in means for the two groups divided by the square root 
of the sum of their squared standard deviations–is a common metric of comparison and is more 
informative than a test of statistical significant difference in means between two large groups. 
Comparing the two groups across 11 variables and four quartiles for each variable, the average 
absolute normalized difference is just 0.04. By comparison, Imbens and Wooldridge (2009) 
suggest that linear regression to estimate treatment effects may be misleading when it is larger 
than 0.25 standard deviations. 
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 Across most of the variables explored in Table SA1, the mean differences between the 
two samples are more pronounced for the smaller farms (the first quartile) and tend to disappear 
by the fourth quartile. This is likely because the full ARMS respondent sample includes many 
very small farms–often without any agricultural production at all, which lowers the average 
values within the first quartile. The differences in the second and third quartiles, though 
sometimes statistically significant, generally diminish and by the fourth quartile, the two samples 
tend to have very similar means across the variables explored.  
We performed a similar comparison for farms meeting our sample criteria. The repeat 
farms correspond to our sample farms while the “Random Draw of Respondent Farms” refers to 
the respondent farms in the random draw that meet our sample criteria. One of the criteria was 
for repeat farms to have crop insurance in one or more years. This criterion cannot be applied to 
general respondent farms. Instead, we require these farms to be participating in crop insurance. 
As before, the comparison shows substantial comparability across the two groups, with an 
average normalized difference of 0.11, with only one case where the normalized difference was 
above 0.25 (excluding the crop insurance participation variable which will be different for the 
two groups by construction) (Table SA2).      
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Figures 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure SA1. Farmers With Lower Initial Coverage Levels Have More Ability to Respond to Increasing Premiums  
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Figure SA2. Farmers With Higher Initial Coverage Levels Depend More on Diversification for Managing Additional Risk  
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Figure SA3. Low-Coverage-Ratio Farms Are Distributed Across Regions 
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Table SA3. How Do Repeat Farms Compare to a Random Subsample of Respondent Farms? 
  Repeat Farms 
Random Draw of 
Respondent Farms 
Normalized 
Diff. in 
Means 
Stat. Sign. 
Difference 
in Means? 
  Mean S.D. Mean S.D. 
Farm Characteristics 
 
Acres 
      
Quartile 1 
(Q1) 
530 1,780 370 1,460 0.07 Y 
Q2 1,470 3,650 1,240 2,700 0.05 Y 
Q3 1,960 6,460 1,750 4,380 0.03 N 
Q4 2,160 5,800 2,250 7,470 -0.01 N 
Value of 
production 
(VOP) 
   
  
  
Q1 37,430 35,400 26,650 31,700 0.23 Y 
Q2 259,250 90,800 245,200 91,300 0.11 Y 
Q3 701,500 178,400 689,900 176,000 0.05 Y 
Q4 2,883,500 3,880,500 3,027,400 11,620,700 -0.01 N 
Crop farm 
(0/1)       
Q1 0.49 0.5 0.47 0.5 0.03 Y 
Q2 0.62 0.49 0.61 0.49 0.01 N 
Q3 0.58 0.49 0.62 0.48 -0.06 Y 
Q4 0.42 0.49 0.47 0.5 -0.07 Y 
Share of 
acres 
harvested 
      
Q1 0.41 0.65 0.38 3.34 0.01 N 
Q2 0.65 0.35 0.66 1.37 -0.01 N 
Q3 0.69 0.38 0.71 0.37 -0.04 Y 
Q4 0.64 0.42 0.66 0.41 -0.03 Y 
VOP/acre 
      
Q1 590 3,120 485 2,710 0.03 N 
Q2 2,720 16,100 2,760 13,500 0.00 N 
Q3 6,770 29,750 6,600 31,800 0.00 N 
Q4 23,700 99,400 30,300 337,700 -0.02 N 
Debt to 
asset ratio       
Q1 0.12 1.71 0.18 9.55 -0.01 N 
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Q2 0.25 7.53 0.17 1.28 0.01 N 
Q3 0.31 8.67 0.31 8.69 0.00 N 
Q4 0.87 48.4 0.35 3.49 0.01 N 
Has acres in 
crop 
insurance 
(0/1) 
      
Q1 0.22 0.41 0.17 0.37 0.09 Y 
Q2 0.49 0.5 0.5 0.5 -0.01 N 
Q3 0.49 0.5 0.54 0.5 -0.07 Y 
Q4 0.41 0.49 0.45 0.5 -0.06 Y 
Operator and Household (HH) Characteristics 
 
  Operator 
age       
Q1 56 12 59 13 -0.17 Y 
Q2 53 12 54 12 -0.06 Y 
Q3 52 11 53 11 -0.06 Y 
Q4 52 11 52 11 0.00 N 
Operator 
experience       
Q1 25 15 27 16 -0.09 Y 
Q2 27 13 28 14 -0.05 Y 
Q3 26 12 27 13 -0.06 Y 
Q4 25 13 25 13 0.00 N 
Off-farm 
income       
Q1 76,300 129,200 82,700 186,800 -0.03 N 
Q2 51,200 115,700 56,550 137,100 -0.03 Y 
Q3 52,400 139,600 52,500 133,500 0.00 N 
Q4 59,400 178,200 59,600 224,800 0.00 N 
Total HH 
income       
Q1 81,200 161,500 83,200 190,500 -0.01 N 
Q2 96,000 177,300 97,800 207,500 -0.01 N 
Q3 154,100 279,100 162,100 271,500 -0.02 N 
Q4 373,200 950,000 420,200 1,397,400 -0.03 N 
Note.‒ The subsample of respondent farms is a stratified random selection of respondent farms such that the 
resulting sample has a similar farm size distribution as repeat farms. This is done by selecting a certain number of 
farms in each size quartiles, where the quartiles are based on the repeat sample. Statistical significance is at the one 
percent level. 
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Table SA2. Comparing Repeat and Respondent Farms Among Farms Meeting Sample Criteria  
  Repeat Farms 
Random Draw of 
Respondent Farms 
Normalized 
Diff. in 
Means 
Stat. Sign. 
Difference 
in Means? 
  Mean S.D. Mean S.D. 
Farm Characteristics 
 
Acres 
      
Quartile 1 
(Q1) 
1,280 1,710 744 1,030 0.27 Y 
Q2 2,130 2,320 1,500 1,320 0.24 Y 
Q3 2,780 2,780 2,200 1,890 0.17 Y 
Q4 4,790 3,700 3,830 2,880 0.20 Y 
Value of 
production 
(VOP) 
   
    
Q1 138,440 75,690 119,300 74,500 0.18 Y 
Q2 414,330 89,600 406,400 88,600 0.06 Y 
Q3 820,350 160,000 803,300 156,300 0.08 Y 
Q4 2,555,100 2,785,300 2,090,500 1,691,000 0.14 Y 
Share of 
acres 
harvested 
    
  
Q1 0.71 0.30 0.74 0.27 -0.07 Y 
Q2 0.80 0.25 0.84 0.23 -0.12 Y 
Q3 0.89 0.21 0.90 0.20 -0.03 N 
Q4 0.94 0.18 0.93 0.18 0.04 N 
VOP/acre 
    
  
Q1 224 196 285 237 -0.20 Y 
Q2 320 250 410 400 -0.19 Y 
Q3 415 250 500 277 -0.23 Y 
Q4 620 500 670 520 -0.07 Y 
Debt to 
asset ratio     
  
Q1 0.10 1.71 0.28 4.47 -0.04 N 
Q2 0.12 0.18 0.19 0.37 -0.17 Y 
Q3 0.14 0.35 0.24 1.00 -0.09 Y 
Q4 0.14 0.40 0.27 1.14 -0.11 Y 
Has acres in 
crop 
insurance 
(0/1) 
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Q1 0.89 0.31 1 0 -0.35 Y 
Q2 0.91 0.29 1 0 -0.31 Y 
Q3 0.92 0.27 1 0 -0.30 Y 
Q4 0.91 0.29 1 0 -0.31 Y 
Operator and Household (HH) Characteristics  
Operator 
age     
  
Q1 52 12 56 13 -0.23 Y 
Q2 51 11 53 12 -0.12 Y 
Q3 51 10 52 10 -0.07 Y 
Q4 52 10 52 10 0.00 N 
Off-farm 
income     
  
Q1 47,580 58,420 60,000 95,000 -0.11 Y 
Q2 46,600 101,500 44,800 59,100 0.02 N 
Q3 46,700 115,800 53,200 135,400 -0.04 N 
Q4 62,700 194,100 48,400 98,200 0.07 Y 
Total HH 
income     
  
Q1 75,800 58,400 91,300 142,000 -0.10 Y 
Q2 126,750 226,550 139,000 197,000 -0.04 N 
Q3 183,750 331,200 221,400 313,100 -0.08 Y 
Q4 440,700 742,700 418,600 649,800 0.02 N 
Note.‒ The repeat farms correspond to our sample farms while the “Random Draw of Respondent Farms” 
refers to the respondent farms in the random draw that meet our sample criteria.Comparison are then made within 
each farm-size quartile. One of the criteria was for repeat farms to have crop insurance in one or more years. This 
criterion cannot be applied to general respondent farms. Instead, we require all of these farms to be participating in 
crop insurance.  
  
65 
 
Table SA3. The Number of Sample Farms Observed in Each Year Pairing 
                            
 Year1/Year2 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Total 
2000 25 131 131 70 53 79 47 37 41 28 31 51 56 780 
2001 0 17 99 67 42 52 38 42 35 13 18 51 15 489 
2002 0 0 78 123 83 120 73 62 45 30 44 84 53 795 
2003 0 0 0 30 99 111 150 85 75 36 88 77 42 793 
2004 0 0 0 0 23 125 65 74 89 36 41 67 59 579 
2005 0 0 0 0 0 41 89 77 46 32 42 63 55 445 
2006 0 0 0 0 0 0 79 147 85 67 66 158 165 767 
2007 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 87 97 57 64 110 94 509 
2008 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 47 110 83 165 130 535 
2009 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 22 186 135 92 435 
2010 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 20 206 115 341 
2011 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 46 209 255 
2012 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 134 134 
2013 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total 25 148 308 290 300 528 541 611 560 431 683 1,213 1,219 6,857 
Note.‒ Year 1 corresponds to the first year the farm was observed; Year 2 corresponds to the second year observed. 
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Table SA4. OLS Estimates Using Observations from the 2001-2007 Period 
              
  
Δ Share of 
acres 
harvested 
Δ Max share 
accounted for 
by one crop 
Δ ln(Value 
of prod. 
/acre)  
Δ ln(Fertilizer 
expenses/acre) 
Δ ln 
(Chemical 
expenses/acre)  
Δ ln(Fert. + chem. 
expenses/acre) 
Δ log premium per acre 0.011** 0.001 0.028** 0.019 0.032* 0.037** 
 
(0.004) (0.005) (0.012) (0.018) (0.018) (0.015) 
Initial premium per acre 0.000 -0.000* 0.000*** -0.000 -0.000 0.000 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Control variables Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
County fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 1,547 1,516 1,531 1,475 1,498 1,529 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.041 0.216 0.125 0.053 0.037 0.057 
Note.‒ The regression is based on farms where the first year observed was after 2000 and the second year observed was before 2008. Robust standard errors 
clustered by county are in parenthesis. County and year fixed effects are included as well as all the control variables mentioned in the text (dummy variables 
indicating zero premiums in the first or second year observed; linear and quadratic terms for the age of the farm operator’s age and the farm’s total value of 
production; the initial share of harvested acres accounted for by soybeans, corn, and wheat, all separately).  Other than the share variables, the dependent 
variables are per acre operated by the farm. The different number of observations across regressions is from some farms not having positive values for the 
outcome variable in at least one year.  
*p < .10. 
** p < .05. 
*** p < .01 
 
 
